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assume symmetric conjectures  on the reaction of the PMs of the same mul-
tiproduct rm, and symmetric conjectures  on the reaction of the PMs of
rival rms. Di¤erent values of the conjectural variations  are equivalent to
di¤erent internal organizational structures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the demand side of the
model starting from a compound CES utility function. Under the assumption
that each brand is produced by a mono-product rm, the market equilibrium
is derived in section 2 through the use of di¤erent conjectural variations. The
results are reinterpreted in section 3 in terms of optimal price-setting behav-
ior of multi-product rms, where the organizational structure of the corporate
rm is endogenous. In particular, it is shown that under market interlacing,
independent PMs may be more protable than a centralized GD. Some con-
clusions are gathered in section 4.
1 Preferences
Consider an economy with identical households. The economy produces a
numéraire homogeneous good and M  1 groups of di¤erentiated goods.
Each group consists of ni  1 (i = 1; :::;M) varieties or brands (indexed
by j = 1; :::; ni, 8i), so that the total number of varieties in the industry is
N =
MP
i=1
ni.
Preferences are identical for all consumers. The representative household max-
imizes the utility function U = U(x0; V ), where x0 is the numéraire good and
U() is homothetic in its arguments. Given this property, the utility maximiza-
tion problem can be decomposed into two steps (Spence 1976). In particular,
we assume that V has a compound CES functional form:
V (xi) =
"
MX
i=1
xi
# 1

(1)
xi(xij) =
0@ niX
j=1
xij
1A 1 (2)
where xij is the quantity consumed of the j-th product of the i-th group and
xi represents the quantity index of the i-th group. Concavity of V [xi (xij)]
requires that 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1 3 . This utility function implies a
3 The love for variety could alternatively be modelled in a slightly di¤erent frame-
work, by extending preferences over a continuous product space (Grossman and
Helpman, 1989; Krugman, 1980).
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constant elasticity of substitution between any couple of varieties of di¤erent
groups of products (inter-group elasticity of substitution):
 =
1
1   > 1 (3)
and a constant elasticity of substitution between any couple of varieties of the
same group of products (intra-group elasticity of substitution):
 =
1
1   > 1 (4)
Lets now denote with Y the consumer aggregate expenditure on the industry
products and with pij the price of the ij-th variety. The consumers problem
becomes:
MAXxijV (x11; :::; xij; :::; xMnM )=
0B@ MX
i=1
264
0@ niX
j=1
xij
1A 1
375
1CA
1

(5)
s:t: Y =
24 MX
i=1
0@ niX
j=1
pijxij
1A35
First, the consumer maximizes xi (xij) subject to the expenditure constraint
on the products of the group i:
MAXxijxi=
0@ niX
j=1
xij
1A 1 (6)
s:t: Yi=
niX
j=1
pijxij
where
MP
i=1
Yi = Y and Yi represents the total expenditure on the i-th group.
In the second step, the household maximizes the utility V as a function of xi,
subject to the budget constraint on the overall of the M groups:
MAXxiV =
 
MX
i=1
xi
! 1

(7)
s:t: Y =
MX
i=1
xiqi
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where qi, the price-index corresponding to the i-th group, is given by:
qi =
0@ niX
j=1
p1 ij
1A 11  (8)
and q, the industry price-index, is given by:
q =
 
MX
i=1
q1 i
! 1
1 
(9)
The solution to the rst step gives us xij(Yi; pij) = Yipij

pij
qi
1 
, while the
two-stage budgeting procedure requires that Y = Yi

qi
q
 1
.
Therefore, the demand schedule for the j-th brand in the i-th group (8j 2
[1; ni]; 8i 2 [1;M ]) is:
xij (pij) =
Y
pij
 
pij
qi
!1   
qi
q
!1 
(10)
Equation (10) will be used in the analysis of rmsprice-setting behavior. If
we are interested in quantity competition, we may consider the corresponding
inverse demand function:
pij (xij) =
Y
xij
 
xij
Qi
!  
Qi
Q
!
(11)
where Qi is the quantity-index of group i, given by:
Qi =
0@ niX
j=1
xij
1A 1 (12)
and Q is the industry quantity-index, given by:
Q =
"
MX
i=1
Qi
# 1

(13)
Notice the immediate interpretation of  and  in terms of the structure of
preferences. The parameters are indicators of the degree of substitutability
between any couple of varieties: the lower , the lower the interdependence
among varieties produced in di¤erent groups; the higher , the higher the
interdependence among brands produced within the same group. At the intra-
group level, as  ! 1 the degree of product di¤erentiation is maximum. As
  !1, there is no intra-group di¤erentiation, the degree of substitutability
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becomes innite and varieties of the same group are homogeneous. In the inter-
group perspective, as  ! 0 the degree of substitution reaches the minimum
level (i.e.  ! 1) and varieties of di¤erent groups become highly di¤erentiated.
As ! 1 there is no di¤erentiation between varieties of di¤erent groups, the
degree of substitutability becomes innite (i.e.   ! 1) and any brand is
perfectly substitutable with any others of the remaining M   1 groups.
Moreover, the di¤erence between  and  plays a fundamental role: when the
inter-group elasticity of substitution is greater than the intra-group elasticity
of substitution (i.e.  > ), brands of di¤erent groups are closer substitutes
rather than varieties of the same group; on the contrary, when  <  each
variety is more substitutable with a brand of the same group. This aspect is
also captured by demand elasticities. In this model three price elasticities are
dened: with respect to the own price, with respect to the price of brands
produced in the same group and with respect to the price of goods produced
in di¤erent groups. Let us denote with xik;pij the cross price elasticity of the
demand function of the ik-th variety with respect to the price of a brand of
the same group, pij; and with xhk;pij the cross price elasticity of the demand
function of the hk-th variety with respect to the price of any other brand of
a di¤erent group, pij. The demand elasticity of the ij-th variety with respect
to the own price, pij, is:
xij ;pij =  
@xij
@pij
pij
xij
=  + (   )
 
pij
qi
!1 
+ (1  )
 
pij
qi
!1   
qi
q
!1 
(14)
The cross price elasticity of the demand of the ik-th variety with respect to
the price of a brand produced within the same group, pij, can be written as:
xik;pij =
@xik
@pij
pij
xik
=  (   )
 
pij
qi
!1 
  (1  )
 
pij
qi
!1   
qi
q
!1 
(15)
The cross price elasticity of the demand of the hk-th variety with respect to
the price of any other brand of a di¤erent group, pij, is:
xhk;pij =
@xhk
@pij
pij
xhk
=  (1  )
 
pij
qi
!1   
qi
q
!1 
(16)
Notice that these elasticities correspond to the elasticities perceived by the
price-maker for the relevant variety, when each of them believes that his deci-
sions do not a¤ect the rivalsprice decisions 4 but takes into account the e¤ect
of his price on the relevant price indices. If xik;pij < xhk;pij (i.e.  > ), then
xij and xik are distant substitutes, while xij and xhk are closer substitutes.
4 That is in case each rm has a standard Bertrand conjectures. We shall generalize
this assumption making use of non-zero conjectural variations in the next section.
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If the opposite holds (for  < , i.e. xik;pij > xhk;pij), xij and xik are close
substitutes, while xij and xhk are distant substitutes 5 .
1.1 An example
In the above discussion, the varieties produced in the market are collected in
groups, which may consist of either close substitutes or distant substitutes. In
order to clarify this point an example may be of help.
Consider the Carbonated Beverages market. In this market it is possible to
group the products according to two criteria. The rst is based on intrinsic
characteristics of the products themselves: e.g. Fruits drinks, Cola drinks and
Fizzy drinks. In this case each group consists of close substitutes. The Fruits
drinks are Fanta, Oransoda, and Lemonsoda etc.; in the second group we nd
Coke, Pepsi, and Virgin; while the last group is made by drinks such as Sprite,
Schweppes, and Seven-Up.
According to a second criterion, however, it is possible to collect products
on the basis of the di¤erent trade-marks under which the varieties are sold.
In this case we have the group of the Coca-Cola Company which produces
distant substitutes, such as Coke, Sprite, Fanta; the same occurs for the Pep-
siCo International Inc. which sells Pepsi-Cola, Mountain-Dew and Slice-Soda.
On the other side,under their trade-marks both Cadbury-Schweppes plc. and
Gruppo-Campari produce close substitutes. For example, in the product line
of the former we can nd Seven-Up, dnL, Schweppes, while the latter produces
Lemonsoda, Oransoda, Pelmosoda and Tonicsoda.
In section 3, the product line of a multiproduct rm will coincide with a
group in the above denition. This allows to cover both the situations which
Brander and Eaton (1984) dene as market segmentation - the multiproduct
rm produces close substitutes (e.g. the Cadbury-Schweppes plc. and Gruppo-
Campari cases) - and those of market interlacing - each company produces
distant substitutes (the Coke-Cola and Pepsi-Cola examples).
5 The substitutability relationship may be expressed using direct or inverse demand
function, and using either elasticities or derivatives. Moreover, the denitions do
not necessary coincide. The concept of substitutability can be denied in terms of
q-substitutes(with reference to the inverse demand function), or in terms of p-
substitutes(with reference to the direct demand function) (Hicks (1956)). Since in
the next sections we shall assume that prices are the rmsstrategic variable, the
p-substitutes approach is more convenient.
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